Abstract-Traditional physical-layer (PHY)-based secret key generation schemes typically assume reciprocity of forward and reverse channels in order for facilitated shared secrecy. However, frequency-selective channels for frequency division duplex links as well as calibration difference of transceiver hardwares can invalidate reciprocity assumption and can cause severe key error floors between users. In this paper, we propose two practical PHY-based secret key generation schemes for multiple-input and multiple-output wireless links over non-reciprocal physical channels. One is pilot assistant secret key (PASKey) generation and the other is eigenvalue-based secret key (EVSKey) generation. In PASKey, both legitimate users estimate the same composite channel, while EVSKey exploits the properties of eigenvalues to generate secret bits. Both are effective against secrecy key theft by eavesdroppers. Furthermore, without adopting public training signals, EVSKey manages to generate secret bits even when nearby eavesdroppers collude. Our two schemes are shown to be more efficient and can achieve lower key error ratio than the existing methods.
I. INTRODUCTION

W
ITH the rising concerns and public awareness of security and privacy of wireless communications, secret key establishment between two communicating devices has become more critical in wireless systems. Due to the inherent broadcast nature of wireless communication systems, it is often difficult for two authorized users to shield their signal transmissions from unintended users. The most common method to establish secret transmission is to use the public keys. However, it is quite complex and power consuming to apply public key cryptography. Additionally, since public key encryption usually requires administrations from third parties [1] , such as certificate authorities or key distributors, it is often less practical in some applications (e.g., sensor networks).
Instead of public key cryptography, physical-layer (PHY) based secret key generation may be a simpler and more flexible method to share secret keys between nodes. The fundamental concept of the PHY key generation is to exploit the inherent randomness of wireless communication channels and channel noises to restrict information leakage to the unauthorized receivers. In [2] , Wyner first introduced the concept of wiretap channel model from which secret key can be generated between two entities even without public communications. Also Wyner showed that a positive rate of perfectly secret communication in the presence of a passive wiretapper is achievable. Then, the Wyner model was generalized by I. Csiszár and J. Körner in [3] . In addition, Maurer [4] further proved that the performance of secrecy extraction can be enhanced by transmitting limited information through public channels. Besides, B. Zhong in [5] investigated physical layer secrecy in multiple relay systems. Through joint beamforming and power allocation, C. Wang focused on how much the maximum secrecy rate can be achieved in peer-to-peer relay networks [6] . While cooperating with jammer, the improved physical layer secrecy capacity is demonstrated in [7] . These researches paved the way for solving PHY secrecy extraction problems.
Almost most PHY-security works focus on investigating secrecy rate or capacity in a given environment, we stress that our work does not follow this thread. Instead of quantifying the secrecy rate (capacity) at PHY, we emphasize the process of secrecy sharing for key generation.
With the goal of maximizing secrecy capacity, the PHY based key generation process should satisfy at least three constrains [12] . Given a random variable S in finite space S and a communication process V, for any > 0, there should hold
where S A and S B are the keys generated at Alice and Bob (the sender and the intended receiver), respectively. These constraints have defined the basic properties of the secret keys. (1) shows that Alice and Bob should generate same keys with high probability while (2) ensures eavesdroppers are less likely to construct the secret keys when observing the communication process V. In addition, with the constraint (3), the keys should be generated with nearly uniform distribution. The constraints from the perspective on secrecy capacity will give us the guidelines to design secret key generation methods.
In addition to the myriad of works on information theoretic approach to secrecy capacity analysis, some researchers also studied the practical implementations of secret key generation systems. In order to extract secrecy from the randomness of practical wireless channels, an intuitive way is to let key users estimate the same set of channels (or different channels but with extremely high correlation) and quantify the channel coefficients directly as their shared secrecy.
Channel reciprocity is easier to satisfy in time-division duplex (TDD) systems. Most existing works based on channel reciprocity attempt to estimate channel information such as phase [8] - [10] and transmission time delay [11] to extract shared secrecy. The authors of [12] - [15] also considered secrecy extraction based on channel amplitude (or channel gain). In reference [12] , Ye et al. proposed two protocols by exploiting the common randomness of the reciprocal channel gains. In addition to deriving the secrecy transmission rate, this work also designed a protocol for practical systems. A detailed survey on channel reciprocity based PHY secret key exploitation can be found in [13] .
We should note that when generating secret key based on common channel observations, the amount of shared secrecy depends on the amount of channel information, typically characterized by its degree of freedom. Compared with single-input and single-output (SISO) systems, multiple-input and multipleoutput (MIMO) communication systems, intuitively, have more degrees of freedom. As a consequence, MIMO channels should be able to provide more randomness owing to their spatial diversity. Considering MIMO channels, much focus has been on the problem of secrecy sharing and informationtheoretical upper bounds in MIMO systems [19] - [21] . On the other hand, Only a handful of papers studied the feasibility and the performance of the key generation schemes in practical systems [22] - [25] . Among others, the authors of [24] proposed and tested a protocol to estimate the channel gain of each path in MIMO systems in order to generate longer secret keys. The authors of [25] proposed two schemes which can achieve lower key error ratio (KER) and longer secret keys between Alice and Bob.
Note that, because of channel estimation errors and channel differences, there often exist some mismatches between the generated keys at Alice and Bob. In order to improve the robustness to such mismatch in secret key generation, Maurer and Wolf [16] - [18] discussed two measures. The first is known as information reconciliation through public discussion and the second is privacy amplification dedicating to prevent information leakage to eavesdroppers. However, both improve the performance of KER at the cost of substantial overhead in terms of signal processing and transmission powers.
Despite their ability to generate shared secret keys, these existing methods based on channel information suffer from several major drawbacks:
• Requirement of channel reciprocity. Many existing schemes require link channels to remain reciprocal during one roundtrip time. The assumption of perfect reciprocity may not be practical even for TDD systems, when considering the lack of uniformity among transceiver radio frequency (RF) front-ends [26] , [27] . On the other hand, channel coherent time may be large, which results in slow variation of channel coefficients through multiple data blocks. Staleness of keys is vulnerable to eavesdropping and significantly reduces the secret key generation rate. In this work, we address some of the aforementioned challenges in secrecy key generation. In particular, we overcome the need for channel reciprocity and develop means for KER improvement. We propose two secret key generation schemes without requirement of channel reciprocity. The first scheme, inspired by [30] and [31] , sends public training signals to estimate bi-directional channels between Alice and Bob. In the second scheme, both Alice and Bob send locally generated data, which are only known by themselves. Both of the schemes require the receiving ends to broadcast the signals via only applying a random unitary matrix to the received signals. Then, both ends extract secret keys through exploiting their common information on the bi-directional channels. Also, we adopt several quantization methods to reduce the mismatch of generated keys. Note that, even though our first scheme, called PASKey, still requires public training signals, it can achieve better performance whereas the second one, called EVSKey, is totally free of public training pilots and is hence more robust against eavesdropping compared with other pilotbased schemes.
Above all, the main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
• We propose two secret key generation schemes, which perform well on non-reciprocal forward and reverse channels. Both of them can generate secret bits by exploiting shared physical channel information effected by our method. In particular, the second scheme is robust to even nearby eavesdroppers that collude.
• With adopted randomly generated unitary matrices, we manage to create virtual channels artificially in order to generate uncorrelated secret bits. We further prove their uncorrelatedness from a theoretical perspective.
• We compare several quantization methods to reduce mismatches of extracted secret keys numerically. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present a detailed system model on MIMO transmission systems for key generation. In Sec. III, we propose the first secret key generation scheme PASKey and discuss both of its advantages and disadvantages. We propose another eigenvalue based scheme called EVSKey, which can generate keys without transmitting public training signals in Sec. IV. We also present the numerical simulation results in Sec. V before concluding in Sec. VI.
Notations: Boldface lower-case and upper-case letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. For a matrix A, we denote its transpose, complex conjugate, Hermitian, and Penrose-Moore pseudo-inverse by A T , A * , A H , and A † , respectively; I R denotes the R × R identity matrix while E{A} represents the expectation of A; A stands for the estimation of matrix A; vec(A) is the operation to stack matrix A into a column; ⊗ is the Kronecker product; tr(A) denotes the trace of matrix A; ||A|| F represents the Frobenius norm of A; |A| or det(A) stands for the determinant of a (square) matrix A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a wireless MIMO transmission system as shown in Fig. 1 . Two legitimate users Alice (A) and Bob (B) intend to transmit confidential signals via encryption using secret keys. Instead of using fixed keys stored in devices in advance, Alice and Bob wish to generate secret keys dynamically by exploiting the randomness of their shared physical channels. The challenging aspect is the existence of at least one eavesdropper Eve (E) attempting to obtain the secret key.
We consider Alice, Bob and Eve to be equipped with T A , T B and T E antennas, respectively. We denote the channel from the node i to the node j as H i j ∈ C T j ×T i , where i, j ∈ {A, B, E}, e.g., the T B by T A matrix H AB represents the channel from Alice to Bob. Without otherwise specifying, we adopt the same boldface lower case letters as the vector representations of the matrices, e.g., h AB = vec (H AB ).
In this paper, we utilize several assumptions below:
• Before transmission, we assume Alice and Bob have already synchronized.
• For this system, we assume that T A ≥ T B . Even though we do not have any constraint on the antenna number of Eve, to be practical, Eve should be allowed to have no fewer antennas than Bob, i.e. T E ≥ T B .
• We assume the MIMO channels to be quasi-stationary such that they remain unchanged within each period of transmission consisting of several data blocks.
• For all the channels, with a rich scattering environment, the entries of each channel are modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) with zero mean and unitvariance [32] .
• We assume the forward and reverse channels may be correlated such that
where the entries of R AB are the correlation coefficients.
• Eve is assumed to be a passive eavesdropper, which means she can neither jam the communication channel nor modify any information transmitted between Alice and Bob. Also, her antenna number, location as well as the channels H AE and H B E are unknown to both Alice and Bob.
• It is assumed Eve is close to Bob. In this case, the channels H AB and H AE are correlated, such that
The correlation matrices, i.e. R AB and K AE B , reflect the status of physical channels and are mostly determined by the relative locations of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers. Particularly, only when Eve is sufficiently far away from Bob, the channel coefficients of H AB and H AE are independent, such that K AE B = 0.
In traditional TDD system based secret key generation methods, perfect channel reciprocity is always assumed, implying H AB = H T B A . Therefore, the correlation matrix can be derived as R AB = P T , in which P is a T A T B by T A T B permutation matrix. However, this reciprocity can not be achieved in practical systems, because of reasons such as calibration variations at RF front-ends. On the other hand, in FDD systems, strong frequency-selectivity with small coherence bandwidth means that h AB and h B A are uncorrelated leading to R AB = 0. In order to address such issue, two PHY based secret key generation schemes are proposed in Sec. III and Sec. IV, respectively.
III. PILOT ASSISTED SECRET KEY GENERATION
The conventional assumption of channel reciprocity used for secret key generation relies strongly on TDD nature of the wireless link. When considering the calibration differences of RF front-ends [27] as well as the more popular FDD systems, forward and reverse channels tend to exhibit weak correlation. The most challenging problem of PHY secret keys extracting from non-reciprocal channels is to obtain the highly correlated information at both sides without sending the estimations directly on the vulnerable public channels. In light of the results from [31] , we propose the pilot assistant secret key generation scheme (PASKey) for non-reciprocal channels. In the first step (prepare stage), Alice generates unitary matrix G A and secret sequence X R ∈ C T A ×N R locally. Meanwhile, Bob prepares randomly generated unitary matrix G B for further transmission. Note that both G A and G B are isotropic random unitary matrix with zero mean and can be adopted by performing singular value decomposition on zero mean complex Gaussian random matrices.
Then, Alice broadcasts its public training signals X A ∈ C T A ×N A with G A and the secret sequence X R as well. The transmitted signals are structured as
where N A and N R are the lengths of the two transmitted signals, respectively, and P 0 is the total transmission power at Alice. To minimize the channel estimation error in point to point MIMO systems, we choose C A and C R as orthogonal pilot matrices [33] , such that C A C H A = C R C H R = I T A . Hence, the two corresponding received signals at Bob can be represented, respectively, as 
Therefore, E and F can be estimated as
and
The approximations in (13) and (14) are valid when SNR is high or the training sequences X A and X B are long enough to get rid of the impact of noises.
In our formulation, we suppose Alice has at least as many antennas as Bob. Also due to the rich scattering in the scenario, H B A (also H B A G B ) is in full rank with high probability [34] . Hence, Alice can obtain the following estimates
With the estimate of H AB , Alice is able to obtain information about H AB G A by multiplexing its G A , shown as
While Alice manages to acquire observations about H AB G A , Bob can directly obtain the similar estimate by utilizing the training sequence from Alice in (8) , denoted as In order to satisfy the constraint in (3), we should generate the secret keys with uniform distribution. According to the Gaussian distributed property of each entry, the quantization level is given by [12] :
where is the inverse cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Gaussian distribution, N is defined as N 2 k and k is the number of generated bits for each quantization. Alice and Bob can divide their MIMO channel estimates into real part and imaginary part. Quantization of these ordered elements can generate secret keys S A and S B , respectively, at both sides. It is obvious that both Alice and Bob will achieve high secret key matching ratio between S A and S B so long as their bidirectional channel estimates are close.
B. Discussions
It is important to note that in practical systems involving passive eavesdropping, Alice and Bob do not have information about nearby eavesdroppers' locations and channels. In order to prevent key breaking by the nearby eavesdroppers, we should have information of both H AB G A and H B A G B available at both sides. However, our estimates on both sides require full rank MIMO channels H AB and H B A . Since this rank condition cannot always be satisfied, then the receiving node would need to select a fewer number of receive antennas when feeding back the echoed information.
Here we discuss how Alice and Bob conceal the information from eavesdroppers, following the impact from the unitary matrices G A and G B . It may appear to a casual reader that the inclusion of the unitary matrix G A is redundant for key exchange. In fact, the use of G A is to foil attempts by nearby eavesdroppers to steal the secrecy shared between Another important reason for rotating the physical channels with random generated unitary matrices G A and G B is to reduce the potentially high correlation among different observations or MIMO channel estimates. In slow fading environment, the underlying MIMO channels may stay nearly unchanged for a period as long as the channel coherence time. Therefore, secret keys generated in such cases tend to become stale, resulting in limited exaction rate of uncorrelated secret bits. However, with randomly generated unitary matrices, the instantaneous physical channels experienced by Alice and Bob can be artificially varied, thereby leading to nearly uncorrelated channel estimates and keys.
In particular, considering two uncorrelated random unitary matrix G 1 and G 2 with zero mean, and for a fixed MIMO channel H, we have
Hence, the advantage of adopting G A and G B is twofold. On one hand, they can artificially decorrelate channel estimates in time even in slow fading environment. Even for slowly moving or near-stationary users Alice and Bob, their shared channel secrets can vary in time to avoid staleness. On the other hand, it also helps fighting against nearby eavesdroppers since the unitary matrices are generated locally. From the protocol discussed in Sec. III-A, the channels H AB G A and H B A G B are necessary to obtain the complete secret key information S A and S B .
Because all training signals except the secret sequence X R may be known to the eavesdroppers, Eve can estimate certain part of the bi-directional channels as a result. From Table I More risks arise when more than one eavesdropper collude. When a central node which can collect observations reported by eavesdroppers near Bob and ones near Alice, both half of the secret keys may become vulnerable. To mitigate the risks of the proposed scheme PASKey posed by colluding eavesdroppers, we will introduce a different key generation method EVSKey in Sec. IV.
IV. EIGENVALUE BASED SECRET KEY GENERATION
In PASKey, the shared secret is vulnerable to eavesdropping primarily because of the use of public training signals for channel estimation when generating secret keys. To improve key security, we should avoid transmitting public training signals that can be utilized by (possibly colluding) eavesdroppers. In this section, we present a different method EVSKey without training which still can exploit roundtrip characteristic of the non-reciprocal channels.
A. The EVSKey Scheme
Before introducing the EVSKey scheme, it is helpful to review a simple lemma below.
Lemma 1: Given two non-zero complex matrices H ∈ C m×n and G ∈ C n×m , GH and HG share the same non-zero eigenvalues.
Proof: Suppose λ is one of the non-zero eigenvalues of HG and v is its corresponding eigenvector, which yields
Since λ is non-zero, the vector Gv is also non-zero. Leftmultiplying G on both side of (20) and defining u Gv, we have
Thus, λ is also the non-zero eigenvalue of GH. Lemma 1 allows both Alice and Bob to extract shared secrecy so long as Alice and Bob each can obtain their roundtrip channel estimates. Considering the two MIMO channels in the two different directions between Alice and Bob, we illustrate the signaling procedures of EVSKey in Fig. 3 and detailed steps as follows. 
where N A1 and N B1 are AWGN at both sides. (III) After receiving Y A1 and Y B1 , both Alice and Bob are required to rotate the received signals with their own unitary matrices G A and G B . After rotation, the re-generated signals are sent back to the original transmitter, which yields
where N A2 and N B2 are the Gaussian noises at the receivers of Alice and Bob, respectively. 
B. Discussions
By taking advantage of the eigenvalue property in Lemma 1, the proposed EVSKey is efficient and easy to be implemented. Because the transmitted signals are randomly generated, there is no need to cache them in advance. Without training signals to be known a priori, the eavesdroppers can not obtain the roundtrip channel estimates through channel estimations. Even if eavesdroppers may acquire partial information about the physical channels, they still have no knowledge on the eigenvalues because of the randomly generated unitary matrices G A and G B .
The feasibility of EVSKey hinges on two conditions: high SNR and slow channel fading environment.
• When zero eigenvalues exist for H B A G B H AB G A or H AB G A H B A G B , channel estimation errors may turn zero eigenvalues into non-zero ones and may also change the ordering of these eigenvalues. Either problem tends to increase KER.
• In terms of channel stationarity, when implemented in half duplex systems, the proposed method requires the channels H AB and H B A to remain nearly stationary for at least 4 data blocks, However, with the implementation in full duplex systems [29] , [35] , the channel coherence time only needs to be longer than 2 data blocks.
C. Dependability and Secrecy Length of EVSKey
In most pilot based secret key generation schemes, both Alice and Bob send the training signals for the other side to estimate channels. As protocol requirement, such training signals should be stored in advance. Consequently, it increases the possibility that nearby eavesdroppers may become aware of the training signals. If nearby eavesdroppers further have highly correlated channels with Bob or Alice, they can estimate their own channels in an attempt to break the keys. Without training signals a priori, the proposed EVSKey is more robust against such nearby eavesdroppers, even when they collude.
Considering the worst case where two eavesdroppers (one close to Alice and the other close to Bob) can acquire the same channels as H AB and H B A and decide to collaborate. Even with perfectly estimated channel coefficients, the eavesdroppers still cannot reconstruct the eigenvalues of the two roundtrip channels without knowledge of the locally kept random G A and G B , for which the lemma is given.
Lemma 2: For the channel H ∈ C m×n whose entries are distributed in CN (0, R) and an isotropic random unitary matrix U, such that E{U} = 0, the mutual information between H and HU is I(H, HU) = 0.
(26) Proof: The mutual information between H and HU is represented as
I(H, HU) = I(vec{H}, vec{HU})
Because (U T ⊗ I m )vec{H} is also complex Gaussian random variable and
(U T ⊗ I m )vec{H} and vec{H} are independent, which yields
One shortcoming of EVSKey is that secret bits generation rate is constrained by the size of channels. Unlike PASKey, which can extract secret bits from every entry of the MIMO channel, EVSKey can only generate secrecy information from the non-zero eigenvalues of the roundtrip channels. Hence, the bits length is limited by the number of non-zero eigenvalues equals min(T A , T B ). And also due to the sensitivity of eigenvalues to the channel estimation errors, it may be difficult for the proposed EVSKey to generate long length secret bits per channel observation. As a result, multiple sessions of EVSKey may be required in practice and the secret key generation rate is limited.
V. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate both PASKey and EVSKey in terms of their KER, key outage probability (KOP), and secrecy rate. In our simulation examples, we consider a three node system with Alice, Bob and Eve equipped with T A , T B and T E antennas, respectively. Unless otherwise specified, we assume Eve is close to Bob and has identical antenna numbers as Bob, i.e. T E = T B . In all simulations, the physical channels consist of independent, zero mean complex Gaussian random variables with unit variance. Besides, in order to simplify the simulation processes and have a better insight for readers, we assume
in which both γ and ρ are correlation parameter scalers. Specifically, γ = 1 implies perfect reciprocity of forward and reverse link channels while γ = 0 leads to uncorrelated ones. Furthermore, noise powers are identical at each node, i.e. σ 2 A = σ 2 B = σ 2 E . The lengths of all the training signals are set equal as N A = N B = N R = N f . Also, we denote K as the number of secrecy bits generated per channel estimation. Numerically, our secret KER and KOP are averaged over 100 independent generated channels while each channel has been further tested in 100 Monte Carlo trials of receiving noises. Note that, performance of KER can be significantly improved by adopting information reconciliation [16] - [18] . However, to ensure fairness of comparison, we only compare the performance of raw key bits in our simulations.
A. Performance of Secret Key Error Ratios
The secret KER plays the most important role in secret key generation problems as it provides the capability Alice and Bob can achieve the same secret keys.
Ideally, KER should be zero without considering the channel estimation errors. However, the errors should be taken into consideration in practical systems and one of the key procedures to reduce the errors is to increase the length of training. In Fig. 4 , we compare the KER of PASKey for different lengths of training and different quantization levels in 4 × 2 × 2 system (T A = 4 and T B = T E = 2). We note the KER decreases as increasing length of training signals since longer training signals lead to more accurate channel estimates so as to lower the KER.
Another interesting and intuitive tradeoff is between the length of the key and its KER. As finer quantization will generate more secret bits but causing higher KER because of the increased key sensitivity to estimation errors. In fact, different quantizers that convert complex channel coefficients to secret bits also affect the performance of KER. As shown in Fig. 5 , we compare two different quantizers, one is based on Cartesian coordinate that quantizes the real and image parts of the channel coefficients while the other depends on the polar coordinates. Results show that both quantizers achieve almost the same performance when SNR < 20 dB. But at higher SNR, the KER of Cartesian quantizer drops faster and the performance gap between the two quantizers grows. Therefore, unless otherwise specified, we will adopt the Cartesian quantizer.
In Fig. 6 , we compare our PASKey with a known method of MOPRO from [25] . As mentioned before, MOPRO, like most of the secret keys generation schemes, relies on channel reciprocity. When testing the performance of MOPRO, we allocate 6 bits to quantify the 2 by 2 unitary matrix and adopt the 4 by 4 unitary matrix codebook with 10 bits. For fairness, we only generate secret bits on estimated composite channel H AB G A in PASKey if otherwise specified. Additionally, we also provide the performance of PASKey based on both forward and reverse link channels for secrecy concerns discussed in Sec. III-B. From Fig. 6 , we can see that even when forward and reverse link channels are reciprocal, i.e. γ = 1, PASKey achieves similar KER performance as MOPRO for SNR ≤ 20 dB, but without an apparent error floor when SNR is higher.
As expected, as the channels become slightly different, e.g., at correlation coefficient γ = 0.999, MOPRO exhibits severe KER deterioration. With minor departure from channel reciprocity, MOPRO exhibits severe error flooring while our proposed PASKey remains unaffected. On the other hand, when we generate secret keys based on both estimated H AB and partial H B A , we succeed in longer keys with some KER performance sacrifices.
Additionally, we compare the KER results of EVSKey with another known method called MOCHA proposed in [25] in Fig. 7 . Note that, this comparison is limited to T A = T B = T E because MOCHA only works for systems with identical number of antennas, unlike EVSKey. As mentioned in Sec. IV-B, there exists tradeoff in the length of data block used for channel estimation. On one hand, more data will provide more accurate channel information to reduce the KER between Alice and Bob. On the other hand, channel fading may increase the KER. As noted in [36] , the coherence time is approximately
in which c is the speed of light, depending on the mobile velocity v and carrier frequency f c . Following the simulation setup in the Long Term Evolution (LTE) [37] , [38] , we have the approximate outdoor coherence time as 9.7 ms when f c = 2 GHz and v = 10 km/h. During this coherence time period, we can transmit at least 135 OFDM symbols. By applying in full duplex mode, we set N f = 64 in Fig. 7 .
From the results, we can see that MOCHA also exhibits error floor caused by the imperfect channel reciprocity while our EVSKey achieves better performance as the SNR increases.
The observations are intuitive because of eigenvalues' sensitivity to channel estimation errors which decrease with increasing SNR and longer data length.
B. Performance of Secret Key Outage Probability
One major concern of PHY based secret key generation is the presence of nearby eavesdroppers. Passive eavesdropper may attempt to acquire (information of) secret keys by estimating their Alice-Eve channels with possibly high correlation with Alice-Bob channels. From (2) , secret key generation scheme should limit the information leakage to nearby eavesdroppers. In terms of key leakage performance, we introduce the metric of KOP to assess the probability that the eavesdroppers generate the same keys. In these simulations, we evaluate the KOP of PASKey and EVSKey while comparing the results with those of MOPRO and MOCHA. The channel correlation parameter between Alice's observed channels and the eavesdropper's channel is set according to the practical experiments from [28] , which shows that In Fig. 8 , we compare the KOP results of PASKey and MOPRO. The outcomes show that when SNR is higher, the KOP becomes larger since Eve can get better channel estimates in order to break keys. Note that, when both forward and reverse link channels are reciprocal, PASKey from only H AB outperforms MOPRO in terms of KOP. In addition, attributed to the random property of G A and G B , the forward and reverse channels can be viewed as uncorrelated. Therefore, we can take advantage of the channel coefficients in H B A to further reduce the KOP of eavesdroppers. In Fig. 8 , the results marked with large and small asterisks represent the KOP from cooperated eavesdroppers around both Alice and Bob. As Alice and Bob can share more secret bits from bi-directional channels, the KOP remains low, even for cooperative eavesdroppers.
On the other hand, against EVSKey, eavesdroppers are unable to learn the eigenvalues of roundtrip channels. Hence, they can only randomly guess the keys. Additionally, since the secret bits generated by EVSKey is uniformly distributed, we can easily conclude that for secret key length K , KOP = 2 −K , which is also confirmed by our numerical results. Nevertheless, to further demonstrate the robustness of our key generation, we provide the eavesdroppers with full information about the randomly generated matrices, G A and G B , while allowing them to cooperate in estimating the correlated channels. From  Fig. 9 , we can observe the KOP performance of both EVSKey and MOCHA. Even though such scenario is not realistic since Eve cannot expect cooperation from Alice and Bob, our results still exhibit much lower KOP than MOCHA. Thus, our EVSKey is superior even when the eavesdroppers have knowledge of the unitary matrices.
C. Secrecy Rates
Secrecy rate serves as an important performance metric as it provides how much secrecy information we can extracted from the physical channel observations. As discussed earlier, PASKey is expected to generate more key bits (and hence higher secrecy rate) whereas EVSKey is limited in its key bit length. As SNR increases, more secrecy information can be extracted from the observed channels. However, when Eve's channel correlation with Alice-Bob channel is high with large ρ which allows Eve to steal certain key information, the secrecy rate drops. The results in Fig. 10 clearly illustrate this phenomenon. In fact, even when eavesdropper has the same channel information as Alice and Bob, there still exists positive secrecy rate, which corroborates the conclusion in [4] . In Fig. 11 , we illustrate the secrecy rate of EVSKey. In order to show the robustness of the EVSKey, we assume eavesdropper is exceptionally powerful such that Eve knows the randomly generated training signals in advance. Still, our numerical results show that, because of eigenvalue sensitivity, even if Eve can estimate its own channels that are correlated with Alice-Bob channels, with correlation coefficient as high as ρ = 0.99, the secrecy loss is not drastic. Naturally, this scenario is quite unrealistic since there is no way for the nearby eavesdroppers to acquire the unitary matrices in advance. As expected, without such information, even with the same channel coefficients at Eve (ρ = 1), the secrecy rate remains the same as uncorrelated channels (ρ = 0). This result illustrates the strength of EVSKey against information leakage.
D. Performance of Secret Key Error Rates Based on Spatial Correlation Model (SCM)
In order to provide more convincing simulation results, we further tested both PASKey and EVSKey based on SCM. The SCM models the propagation characteristics of the wireless communication channels and has been adopted by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) for link-and system-level simulations [39] . Upon the system parameters adopted by LTE [37] , carrier frequency of the MIMO-OFDM system is set to be 2GHz in this work. Each OFDM resource block takes 15kHz bandwidth while the total bandwidth for transmission is 5MHz. The detailed simulation parameters are given in Tab. II. In this work, we assume FDD mode is applied, which means the forward and reverse channel are separated at least the coherence bandwidth. Therefore, we would generate both the channels independently but with the same parameters.
In Fig. 12 , we plot KER performance of PASKey based on MIMO SCM. In this scenario, we assume T A = 4 and T B = 2 and estimate the MIMO channel H AB for secret bits generation. With the 8 complex channel coefficients per channel estimation, secret keys with length 16, 32, and 48 are generated through different Cartesian quantizers. Similar to the results in Fig. 6 , the KER performances decrease continuously with increasing of SNR due to the less affection from channel noises. And unsurprisingly, the performance is getting better when generating less secret bits from each channel coefficient because the quantizer with shorter length is less sensitive to estimation errors.
Similarly, we show the KER performance of EVSKey in 4 by 4 MIMO scenario based on SCM in Fig. 13 . As illustrated in the figure, different lengths of secret bits are generated per channel estimation, respectively. Due to the spatial correlation involved in the channel coefficients, the smallest eigenvalue of the composite channel is close to 0, which leads to a likely rank deficient composite channel. As a result, the smaller eigenvalues are more sensitive to the estimation errors and more likely to be flipped over, resulting in severe secret key mismatching. In order to reduce the KER, we decide to generate bits from robuster eigenvalues, e.g. ones with larger Frobenius norms. Therefore before quantizations, we sort the estimated eigenvalues decreasingly based on their Frobenius norms after channel estimations. In Fig. 13 , the line with triangular indicates the KER performance of secret bits converted from the first two robuster eigenvalues, leading to the length of secret bits equals 8. The other two lines are the ones from the first three and all the eigenvalues, respectively. It is clear that there exists significant tradeoff between the length of generated secret bits per channel estimation and its KER. Therefore, how to balance the length of secret bits and its KER remains further exploitation but out scope of this paper.
E. Successful Decoding Rates of Encrypted Packets
In order to test impact of encryption on packet reception, we use network simulator 3 (NS3) to evaluate the successful decoding rate of encrypted packets under different transmission rates. During the simulation, the Rayleigh fading channel model is applied without loss of generality. By estimating the channel coefficients between Alice and Bob, both nodes generate secret keys via PASKey and EVSKey, respectively. Then Alice encrypts the transmission packets using the generated secret keys for Bob to decrypt. The encrypted packets have length of 1500 bits, and are transmitted via OFDM at transmission rates ranging from 12Mbps to 48Mbps.
Note that the procedures of information reconciliation and privacy amplification can also be further integrated. For proof of concept focusing on key distribution, we did not use them in our simulation. Numerically, the key sharing processes are tested over 10000 times and the average packets success decoding rates are illustrated in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 , respectively.
As illustrated in Fig. 14 , the successful decoding rate of the encrypted packets grows from 0 to 1 with increasing SNR. Intuitively consistent, the required SNR for successful packet transmission is larger at faster transmission rate. In the high SNR region, almost all the packets can be received securely, i.e. the successful decoding rate of the encrypted packets is close to 1, owing to the high probability of secret key agreement. However, in the lower SNR region, the performances are severely degraded after missed decryption mainly caused by the high secret key mismatch rates. Similar conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 15 when EVSKey is adopted. Note that, when comparing the results in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 , EVSKey with shorter length secret keys appears to outperform PASKey. However, from the secrecy perspective, shorter keys are more vulnerable to be broken. Therefore, the tradeoff between the performance of encrypted packet success decoding rates and the length of secret keys should be carefully evaluated according to the requirement and the physical environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the problem of PHY-based secret key generation for encryption. Unlike many existing works, we focus on the broader system model without channel reciprocity between two communicating nodes. Considering MIMO wireless channels, we present two secret key generation methods, PASKey and EVSKey, that are generally applicable to links without reciprocal channels. The proposed PASKey scheme utilizes bi-directional channel estimates to generate secret bits. The second EVSKey scheme utilizes roundtrip MIMO channel matrices and takes advantage of their common non-zero eigenvalues. Without training, EVSKey generates fewer secrecy bits while PASKey exhibits higher secrecy rate. Both schemes can overcome certain shortcomings of traditional PHY systems for secrecy key generation, particularly traditional reciprocitybased key generation schemes. Numerical results demonstrate their advantages in terms of KER, KOP, and secrecy rate. 
